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Hawkins presents three pleas in his persuasive attempt to put legal
decisions in context. The first is for a critical assessment of the basic concepts
which are used in the socio-legal analysis of decisions. The second is for a
naturalistic perspective within which to carry forward this critical examina-
tion. The third is for additional close institutional analyses using the natur-
alistic approach to the social organization of decision-making. The overall
style of Hawkins' paper is in some sense ironic.' He intends by his analysis,
conceptual framework, and critique of rationalistic decision-making, to set
out an alternative social reality, and to ask as a corollary how such specialized
social worlds as are represented in legal institutions are created and main-
tained. This comment examines the case made by Hawkins which urges the
utility of detailed examination of legal decisions and legal decision-making:
"[T]here exists only a very imperfect understanding of the ways in which
legal discretion is exercised," and claims that a current fundamental require-
ment is to identify ". . . some of the central concerns which theoretical
explorations into decision-making should address."
The aims of these remarks are to describe some aspects of the social
world of the law shaping decisions and a natural approach to this social
reality. The bulk of the paper is a consideration of three concepts essential
to any naturalistic study of the social organization of decision making:
decision, decision-field, and the situated relevance of the non-field. A
perspective on decision, and semiotics, the science of signs, are presented as
preliminary to the analysis, while auxiliary concepts such as frame, sub frame
and master frame, decision-field and boundaries are also useful.
* B.A., M.A., Ph.D.; Professor of Sociology and Psychiatry, Michigan State University;
Senior Principal Scientific Officer, Center for Socio-Legal Studies, 1984-86, Wolfson College,
Oxford. The proximal stimulus for this essay is Hawkins' lecture to which I was asked to
respond. What follows is an elaborated statement of the line of argument which my comments
were intended to develop in the event. Many themes in Hawkins' paper cross the fields of law
and social science, and it would be importunate to attempt a comprehensive evaluation. The
outline of an argument that follows draws primarily upon recent field studies of the police in
Britain and America and of the regulation of nuclear safety in which I am currently involved.
The analytic perspective adopted is detailed in P. Manning, Queries Concerning the Decision-
Making Approach to Police Research, in J. SHAPLAND (ed.), DECISION-MAING IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 50-60 (1981); P. Manning, Signwork, HUMAN RELATIONS 283-308 (Vol. 39 1986); and
P. Manning, Symbolic Communication: Organizing a Police Response (forthcoming).
1. See P. Manning, Metaphors of the Field, 24 AD. SCI. Q. 660 (1979); R. BROWN, A
POETIC FOR SOCIOLOGY (1977).
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The Naturalistic Conceit
In arguing for naturalism, 2 Hawkins asserts his interest in describing
decisions in social context, an interest shared with other sociologists,3 social
psychologists, 4 anthropologists, 5 and political scientists. 6 In a somewhat
narrower and more restrictive fashion, this interest is shared with operations
researchers and students of artificial intelligence and computer science.7 By
describing processes as they occur, indicating individual interests and cliques,
social values and beliefs, ignorance and error, Hawkins penetrates the formal
facade of the legal institution to display its workings and its various forms
and content. Thus he links the social relations that make the law possible
with the formal structures within which it operates and the ideologies which
justify it. Perhaps this naturalistic approach to the social reality of law could
be explicated as an introduction to a conceptual critique of Hawkins' version
of natural decision-making.
A naturalistic approach to decision-making in the context of the partic-
ular social reality that is associated with legal institutions would attempt to
link the types of decisions, their location and form, to the law as a kind of
corporate going concern. The aim is to connect decision points, or the
contingent conjunction of groups or interests, with the cognitive frames
which locate the relevant field defining a particular social reality and inter-
nally pattern it.8 Messages and texts, taken to legitimately represent the
mandated outcomes of the application of frames to decision-points within a
field, are constituted from signs which have multiple referents. 9 The individ-
ual decision-maker is less critical than the social institution within which
decision-points, frames, messages and texts (cases) are typically located. It is
the social organization of legal institutions, the recognized frames and sub-
frames, the special discourse of law, and the relevant decision-points (e.g.,
bail, preliminary hearing, trial, sentence, parole as one line of action) which
give reality and life to all that is taken to be legal. An outline for a
naturalistic study of legal decision-making, which Hawkins has presented,
2. D. MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT (1969).
3. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); T. SCHEFF, BECOMING MENTALLY ILL
(1966); A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1968); R. EMERSON,
JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969); C. Lmz, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT (1984); cf. W. Wagel, infra
note 72.
4. W. EDWARDS & A. TvERKY (eds.), DECISION MAKING (1967); B. FISCHOFF, ET AL.,
ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981); S. KONECINI & A. E. BEESON (eds.), THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1982); D. KAHNEMAN, SLOVICK & A. TvEPSKY, JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1982).
5. E. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1960); M. SWARTZ, LOCAL-LEVEL
POLITICS (1968); M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
6. C. LINDBLOM & D. BRAYBROOKE, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1962); G. ALLISON,
ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971); A. WILDAVSKY & J. PRESSMAN, IMPLEMENTATION (1973); P.
BRACKEN, THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FORCES (1983).
7. J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANISATIONS (1958); H. SIMON, SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL
(1981).
8. E. GomAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974).
9. See F. DESAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1966).
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would seek to show initially how such a legal world is created and sustained,
as well as to make salient the central concepts which link the processes of
decision-making to that special social world.
The Social Reality of the Legal Institution
The social organization of legal decision-making is embedded in an
institutional structure; as Hawkins has written elsewhere, social relationships
in some sense transcend and shape the law.' 0 This institutional structure
sustains a social reality" and includes patterns of guided interaction, a
structure of roles, statuses and information distribution, functions, a cere-
monial order, and a mandate expressed in ideological terms. Hawkins has
shown that it is only by careful, systematic and detailed observation of legal
decision-making en situ, that one could demonstrate the special selective,
idealized, limited, and constrained character of what is usually described as
"legal decision-making." Perhaps as a way of illustrating Hawkins's argu-
ment about the ways in which court decisions are seen as a "typical" or
representative of legal institutions' decision-making, special reference can be
made to the social reality of the courts, bearing in mind that they are special
and represent only one locus of legal decisions. A discussion of these five
components should also assist us in discerning the special social reality that
the legal institution sustains. Let us look at these five components.
1. Interactions in court are guided by specialized rules governing the
order of speech, turn-taking and topic, the form of speech, its style and
prosaic features, its content and even the length of given utterance.12 These
rules governing the structure of talk are complemented by specialist roles
and statuses (positions and their functions), authority (especially to decide
outcomes), and patterns of information. There are also less clear tacit rules
about the assumptions of court order and the relevance of various forms of
knowledge to such ordering.'3
2. The structure of the court is based on the existential assumption that
"the business of the law is the business of making decisions." This is made
manifest by a structure designed to establish operational truth and to validate
a version of reality. As Hawkins points out, this may or may not be
adversarial, have a binary outcome, and be based on formal legal knowledge.
The rulings or decisions taken are believed to be binding on the participants,
win or lose. These deliberations are guided by the above rules of interaction,
and by those of evidence and proof. The structure intends to protect the
10. K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 7 (1984).
I1. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
12. See J.M. ATKINSON & P. DREW, ORDER IN COURT (1979); D. MCBARNET, CONVICTION:
THE STATE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (1981); W.L. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981); P. CARLEN, MAGISTRATES' JUSTICE (1976).
13. A. CICOUREL, METHOD AND MEASUREMENT IN SOCIOLOGY (1964); H. Garfinkel, A
Conception of, and Experiments with "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions, in
O.J. HARVEY (ed.), MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 187-238 (1964).
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innocent, omit evidence not crucial to decisions, and provide for self-
protection. This may or may not occur in actual court interactions, but the
structure is conducive to that. 14 In a social world that is screened for
relevance, closed by legal reasoning and conceptual fictions, and displayed
in specialized discourse, the interpretation and translation of legal rules takes
place.
3. Law ostensibly functions to produce either compliance, sanctioning,
or both, using the grand or grounding norm of the monopoly of violence as
its ultimate sanction." In this sense, the law purports to do more than the
quotation from Raz cited appreciatively by Hawkins. It not only intends, as
do other institutions such as medicine, religion, and education, to guide
behavior, to intervene in society, to support or reward various normative
standards in the society, and to evaluate behavior; it does so in the interests
of the state and with the ultimate sanction of violence. 16
4. Law aims to counterfactually stabilize reality.17 It sets out norms and
standards of behavior said to represent good conduct, and rewards and
dramatizes them in spite of the institutional function of processing the
various failures, delicts, violations, and conflicts which are deeply character-
istic of human society. The sustaining nature of this belief in the singular
reality produced and reproduced by legal decisions is such that it survives in
spite of evidence of human character displayed in the work of legal institu-
tions.
5. The legal institution is highly ritualized; i.e., it is marked off from
everyday life by power and authority and its processes and outcomes reaffirm
this. This ritual order is confirmed by symbols and by dramas in public
settings where the binding nature of the outcomes is displayed and taken to
be definitive. An ideology of justness, fairness and due process sanctions the
procedures and the outcomes of institutional decisions; this marks the
outcomes and excludes consideration of alternative ideologies.
Three defining elements of the legal institution which can be analytically
identified are the mandate or legitimate authority to decide; a moral world
of right and wrong, good and evil, proper and improper, on which such
authority rests; and an identifiable legal consequence of decisions. The three
can be seen to appear separately in the sense that authoritative moral
decisions may not have legal consequences, and that legal consequences may
result without moral reasoning being brought to bear. In a sense then,
"legal" is a gloss for moral actions that have consequences attributed to
legal decisions.' 8
14. D. McBarnet, supra note 12.
15. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (M. Knight trans. 1967); J.W. Harris,
Kelsen's Concept of Authority, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353 (1977).
16. See M. WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (M. Rheinstein trans. 1960).
17. N. Luhman, Communication About Law in Interaction Systems, in K. KNORR-CENTINA
& A. CICOUREL (eds.), ADVANCES IN SOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 234-256 (1981).
18. Cf. R. Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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This sketch of the social reality of legal institutions is of course an ideal-
type, selectively patterned and guided by the aim of characterizing the legal
institutions, using the courts as a paradigmatic case. It is this model of social
reality that has been seen as exhaustive of legal decision-making forms,
contents, outcomes, interactions, and settings. However, as Hawkins has
pointed out, a variety of types of legal decisions are taken by people
individually and in groups, and by people with widely different roles in the
system. Different outcomes are possible: not all are public, individual, binary,
formalized, and guided by detailed formal rules.
Perhaps most importantly, the general point about the naturalistic ap-
proach to legal decision-making is that the elements identified in the social
reality of the courtroom can be seen throughout the legal system, and hence
pattern the decisions taken in this system at various points. That is, an
analytic framework that is suggested by Hawkins includes the guided and
structured nature of interactions viewed as legal, and the patterns of authority
which shape them; the binding nature of the decisions and the ultimate
sanction of state-legitimated violence lying ready to enforce these decisions;
the symbolic elevation of legal rules and decisions over the messy character
of everyday conduct; the ritualized and ideologically justified nature of the
decisions called legal; and the conflation of law, justice, morality and, in
extreme, the state itself. These features, implicit in Hawkins's argument, can
be seen in varying degrees in the wide variety of decisions taken to be
"legal." Thus, although the court provides a dramatically marked and salient
example of a context within which legal decisions are taken, it should be
seen as exemplifying these features rather than being the sole setting in which
they appear. Hawkins suggests that such features of decision-making, further,
are not exclusive to the legal system and are found elsewhere; thus, he raises
gentle doubts about the special character of legal decisions and, indeed, the
special character of the law itself. By juxtaposing the social character of all
decisions with the special claims made for legal decisions, Hawkins is
engaging in ironic observation.
Hawkins has not simply made legal decision-making ironic; he has also
broadened the scope of what should be taken to be "legal" as well as what
should be viewed as a "decision." Unfortunately, however, Hawkins has
identified "decision" and "decision-making" by means of clarifying what
he argues they are not. They are the center of an empty circle, rotating
within a surround that includes pressures, factors, forces, values, and
perspectives that affect the decision but that may not be a feature of a
cognitively isolated idea like "decision." Hawkins instructs us about what a
decision is not, given his frame of reference, but does not say very much
about what it is.
Decision must be coupled with conceptions of a decision field and
decision points within that field. In addition, some conception of forces
lying outside the immediate decision-context yet affecting and shaping it is
required as well. These might be called non-field. Non-field refers to influ-
ences such as economic and cultural forces (norms, values, practices, and
technologically determined social relations) and to subtle but elusive notions
1986] 1295
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such as the tacit knowledge that lies just beneath the surface of "rational"
decisions. 9 The border between field and non-field is situationally defined.
Hawkins details some of the limits or boundaries, cognitive and social, within
which decision-processes take place. These are frames or perspectives. A
frame provides a link between criteria and outcome and an interpretation of
those connections; it provides a set of background expectancies or meanings.
20
The social organization of natural decision-making, encompassing the
core ideas of decision, decision-field, surrounding and embedding forces,
frames, and boundaries, is the topic of the next three sections of the paper.
Decision
Hawkins distinguishes decision, decision-making and a justification for
a decision. For him, "decision" refers to the outcomes of deciding, based
on a choice as to action, whilst "decision-making" speaks to the process of
making up a mind. Both decision and decision-making are "constituent parts
of a continuous process which seamlessly connects one salient decision-point
with the next." The process is elusive, "an almost infinite number of complex
decisions of greater or lesser significance about the handling and processing
of a case between these salient decision points." Decisions are thus known
after the fact in terms of consequences or outcomes, and the making of such
is a matter of crystallization or "making up one's mind." The process links
one decision to the previous one and forthcoming decision(s). Some decisions
are more important, or "primary" whilst others are "secondary." Finally,
Hawkins distinguishes "deciding" from "ratifying," a notion similar to
"primary" and "secondary" decision, since "deciding" implicitly precedes
as well as is primary to a "justification" or ratification.
(a) Semiotics
These definitions contain some muddles that can be perhaps sorted out
by adopting linguistic and semiotic approach to decision .2 An expression
(signifier) may be linked to a given content (signified) by several sorts of
relationships, metonymy (part for whole; whole for part, as in "Red Steps"
as a name for a cottage); metaphor ("the dance of life") or a variety of less
common rhetorical links such as the use of irony, oxymorons, hyperbole,
meiosis, and personification. Each sign (an expression and content linked
within a context) is, in turn, connected to others. Syntactical relations are
19. M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1967); R. NEEDHAM, AGAINST THE TRANQUILITY
OF Axioms (1983).
20. See H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967); A. Cicourel, supra note
3.
21. See B. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (1985), for a very useful introduction
and overview of the semiotic approach to law. Semiotics is summarized in T. HAWKES,
STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS (1977), and J. CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POLITICS (1975), and




also important-syntactical relations such as inversion, antithesis, repetition,
as well as more literary constructions, alliteration, rhyme and various forms
or genre.
22
When a set of signs such as a report is read, one is reading a given form
or type of ordering and connection of signs, often constrained by a format,
or a set sequence and required units of data. These formal and syntactical
relations are exemplified by assumed functions of given expressions (e.g., a
psychiatric use of diagnostic categories, or a prison governor's use of a
classification term for security), and are seen as referential, having a reality
in the person to whom the data refer, as well as having a synedocheal
relation to the whole person. (An "A" level security risk captures the
essential character of the person, not just an organization tag.) It has also a
metaphoric or analogous meaning: The prisoner is unlike "B," "C," and
"D" prisoners in one sense, while like them in another. At a "higher" level,
the denotation "A" also refers to the person's being "more dangerous than
the general public," and sets him or her aside. Each connection of expression
and content, of sign to sign, and of sign to referent as constructed in a given
text, report, case, or file, represents the archaeology of and sedimentation
of many decisions. But the way in which a case may be read or read-off can
vary, since a single sign such as a report on conduct or a "ticket," can gloss
an entire file and represent perhaps contradictory sets of observations made
by various persons.
A case can be seen as an assemblage of signs for which a careful analysis
of semiotic patterning is required. 23 If a sign is something that stands for
something (a signifier) in a context, a decision is an assemblage of signs that
may be glossed by a single sign that conflates or condenses the various
nuances of a decision. For example, a decision to arrest contains complex
facts about the offense, offender, victim (if any), opportunity, and evidential
and procedural constraints. All of these are compressed, for example, in an
arrest report drawn up by a P.C. An arrest is merely a consequential outcome
that glosses previous processes and decisions.
24
If "decision" refers to such outcomes, denotated and connotated by
signs, it is also indicative of choice in Hawkins's vocabulary. Inaction is also
a form of action. In some sense, however, an identifiable consequence is a
22. See C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 213 (1973).
23. From a methodological point of view, seeing the report or file or case as a whole,
something of a gestalt which is "handled" or "decided" or "processed" along with others
which are similarly characterized, stands in contrast to a conception of the case or file as an
assemblage of signs made meaningful by a variety of cases. U. Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS
(1976). In the former, the logic is one of the repetitive processing of cases (whether by a case-
by-case logic or one that chunks and clusters types or groups, or categories handled in similar
fashion) whilst in the other, the process is one of examining syntactical and semantic links made
between the signifiers and between signifiers and the signifieds. The closer one looks into the
constitution of texts, as Hawkins does in the latter part of the paper, the more difficult it is to
grasp the processing system or patterns of general disposal.
24. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, ARREST (1966); J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1972).
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signified for which a signifier is sought to complete the sign. In theory, the
sign is complete insofar as an outcome is already known to have been
produced and is indicated-in this example by the arrest report. It may have
been seen, or reviewed, in some fashion, so that event, decision and conse-
quence are all represented by a single file, report, or case-record. This is
certainly true in the case of the parole decisions described in the latter part
of the Hawkins article. However, a text or a report is in fact a set of signs,
standing for a number of "decisions." Each text has multiple referential
properties or signifiers, each one of which stands in interpretive relationship
to the others.25 Some suggestion of this complex interpretive work concerning
the reference of "misconduct(s)" is provided by Hawkins. The work of
further linking such signs to broader institutional or juridical concepts is a
recoding of such meanings, now with reference often to binary outcomes
such as release or retention in prison.
26
Such complex, situated interpretation is reduced to a file, to what
Goffman terms "paper reality,"' 27 which in turn is the basis for largely
analogous decision processes. Thus, a family of similarities28 may obtain
amongst cases, rather than a single dimension or set of criteria which orders
decisions. These analogous connections, Hawkins shows, are often seen as
accomplishing stated official aims ("running the joint") and are cast in
official discourse. This may obscure or prevent decisions made on the basis
of close scrutiny of detailed case-file content. The reflexively attributed
coherence granted to case decisions, as Bourdieu points out, is "institution-
alized misrecognition" of differences. 29 That is, although a case may be seen
as different, the particulars are not seen as relevant to the decision. Rather,
what produces the analogous relationship between this case, one of miscon-
duct, and others is the general aim of "running the joint." In this sense,
particulars disappear. Similar rules may operate within organizations gener-
ally such as screening for burglary cases in which those that report a low
value for items lost, those without witnesses or physical evidence, and those
more than a few days old are sorted into a pile for routine closure. They
are treated in general terms, metaphorically, as low-yield cases.30 The opposite
features characterize high-yield cases. This is in effect an analogous process
of decision based on typification of a case which then is seen as being like
either high- or low-yield cases. Only those "making the cut" and seen as
high-yield will be investigated further.3'
25. U. Eco, supra note 23.
26. See A. CICOUREL, supra note 13, on this process in juvenile justice.
27. ASYLUMS (1960).
28. L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Von Wright, eds; D.
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1969).
29. P. BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 171 (1977).
30. R. ERICSON, MAKING CRIME (1982).
31. See, e.g., K. Polk, A Comparative Analysis of Attrition of Rape Cases, BRITISH




Decision-making in this sense is not "making up a mind," because there
is nothing mentalistic implied by an official description.12 How can one know
if a mind or minds have been "made up" when decisions are known only
as a result of observing consequences and inferring a moral context? This
conception provides an interpretation of the ostensibly official linkage or
process of deciding, but "minds" need not do anything, if indeed they
could. It is impossible to disentangle "decision" from observed consequences,
and preferred justifications or ratification. All that can be known are various
accounts, or explanations provided upon request for a problematic action.3"
Accounts (and written texts that are a form of account), in turn, are
organizationally grounded.3 4 That is, the grammar of accounts, their stylistic
properties and their credibility, as well as the conditions under which they
typically will be expected, are organizationally patterned.35 Detailed semiotic
analysis of organizational discourse 6 reveals these patterns.
A series of points concerning the semiotics of messages, even as quickly
rendered as this one, suggests that the close analysis of systems of signs
within an organizational context makes problematic many of the individu-
alistic and mentalistic assumptions in the Hawkins essay. For, whilst his
analysis places considerable emphasis upon individuals making choices of
differential weight and relevance to outcomes, a semiotic analysis would
examine the available codes and signs and the ways in which they were
organizationally patterned. Such an analysis, although holding to the notion
of naturalistic description, would be more inclined to "de-center" attention
from individual actors, and place rather more importance on the systems of
rules and codes that order communication, and the modes of legal discourse
that predominate.3 7 It is not unimportant, as Hawkins emphasizes, that in
the end many legal decisions are presented in public contexts as binary. It is
the dialectic between the formal presentation of outcomes as binary and the
decision-process, looked at within the social organization of such decisions,
that is significant.
(b) Discretion
Similarly, a linguistic-semiotic perspective would find notions of "dis-
cretion" and rule-following rather misleading because they focus on individ-
ual choice against a hypothetical background of the assumed relevance of
normative standards that act in advance to guide choice. How could one
know in advance what the thoughts of decision-makers are? There is a long
tradition of assuming that one can; it is manifested in the massive adminis-
32. L. Wittgenstein, supra note 28, at 14-16.
33. S. LYmAN & M. SCOTT, SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD (1970).
34. R. ERICSON, supra note 30.
35. See P. MANNING, POLICE WORK 174-175 (1977).
36. C. Lemert, Language, Structure and Measurement, AM. J. OF Soc., July 1979, at 929-57;
P. Manning, supra note *.
37. C. Lemert, supra note 36, at 929-57; C. LEmERT, THE TWILIGHT OF MAN (1979).
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trative-law literature burdened with the problem of "discretion. '3
Given the nature of the idea of decision advanced here, discretion is a
term with many referents. There are several reasons for this. The first is
that, as Dworkin39 has noted, discretion makes its appearance under special
conditions: when a decision is made subject to standards set by another
authority. More precisely, I think what this means operationally is that
discretion appears when a review is made by someone in authority of someone
else's decision. Everyday decisions are not routinely reviewed, nor confronted
with "standards." There are, on the other hand, a variety of socially
determined organizational contexts within which decisions are taken and
reviewed. 40 These contexts mean discretion varies; discretion is not a single
idea.
The second reason is that discretion is seen when power issues are raised
(when one is attempting to coerce another to do something, even when it is
against his will). 4' This means that when a decision is said to have been
made, and standards are brought to it by someone else in authority, then
discretion and power both make their appearance. This leads Baldwin and
Hawkins42 to assert that "discretion is really about power." Its connection
with the legal surfaces in so far as a decision is justified or accounted for
with respect to legal rules.
The third reason is that legal literature reifies "case" and "decision" by
making them synonymous, and leaving out the social organization of deci-
sion. (This is what Hawkins painstakingly builds up in the first half of his
essay.) Rarely can any single identified point indicate a decision has been
taken. Any mythical point would conflate, and carry compressed and col-
lapsed, previously decided matters with others yet to come. There is no such
single point; it exists as a legal fiction, and is indexed by legal or juridical
decisions about cases that are publicly issued, and published in the legal
literature.
The fourth is that such logic, as has been explained above, obscures the
very complex assemblage of signs that constitute a case. Although writers
have suggested the relevance of terms such as the "decisional referents" of
a case 43 and the polycentric nature of decisional problems, the very complex
and shifting nature of these points is asserted rather than studied by
administrative lawyers. How the case is partitioned into units (facts or
concepts), how these units are arrayed in some fashion (as to importance or
38. H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1977); K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE (1969).
39. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
40. R. Baldwin & K. Hawkins, Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered, PuB. L., Winter
1984.
41. Z. Bankowski & D. Nelken, Discretion as a Social Problem, in M. ADLER & M.
AsQUrTH (eds.), DISCRETION AND WELFARE (1981).
42. C. LEMERT, THE TWILIGHT OF MAN 73.
43. D.J. Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1972).
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significance to a decision), how audiences are taken into account by decision-
makers, how the ideological context and the non-field can alter or change
the salience of these units, is nowhere discussed. Decision process is assumed
to be the stuff of political decision- making, but only a few works have
actually examined it.4
(c) Rules
The irony of rules is suggested by Bouridieu. 41 They exist as potential
justifications for decisions, and their strength lies in not having to be actually
used to bring decision, decision-making, and decision-field publicly into line.
Law in this sense is a power system that operates to legitimate, to threaten,
to potentially sanction, and to justify the myriad of muddles, confusions,
conflicts and problems brought to it. 6
The internal mapping of the decision field is not rule-bound in the usual
sense of rules as either guides, limits, or proscribed options. This is implied
above in the discussion of the role of rules in "decision." The point here is
that rules are second-order justifications for interests and practices. 47 This
formulation of the relationship between rules and discretion and their
relationship to legal decision(s), suggests that it would be of value, not to
examine rules or discretion, but to examine cases, the concept of case, and
"caseness" within legal settings.
The notion of "case" is very closely linked with legal decisions. Case is
the basic unit within a legal system. There are several reasons for this
connection. There is an historic link between "victim" or "complainant"
and a case in both civil and criminal law. The case may, of course, be
constituted of several similarly positioned legal actors such as in a class-
action suit; of a corporation or group; or of several offenses or charges
attributed to a given offender or suffered by a given victim. 4 8 The concept
as used in social science is borrowed. An analytic definition of case may
contrast with a concrete, institutionalized definition or practice. The differ-
ence is not well delineated in Hawkins's paper, since his analysis presents
vignettes from several different state parole boards and cases. It is very
difficult to distinguish "decision-making" in Hawkins's analysis from case-
decisions or case-processing. That he does intend a distinction is suggested
in the section of his article in which he takes up the definition of "facts."
(d) Facts
The "facts" of a case may be constituted by several different kinds of
processes. Some types of "facts" are to be established as relevant, often in
44. Cf. R. WOHLSTETTER, PEAR. HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION (1962); G. ALLISON,
ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971); P. BRACKEN, supra note 6.
45. P. BORDIEU, supra note 29.
46. N. Luhmen, supra note 17.
47. P. BORDIEU, supra note 29, at 40.
48. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1980), and MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE
(1983).
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American courts by means of preliminary hearings on the admissibility of
evidence. Others are merely stipulated; still others are subject to courtroom
debate. How such court-validated facts may be used, shared between counsel,
or, indeed, further contested when quite different versions of events are
contained in affidavits, may also be adjudicated. However, the various
features of an offender's social composition may be volatile assemblages not
subject to adjudication or binary affirmations of social reality. Hawkins
asks: "When officials handle criminal cases and talk of such things
as'offense,"record,' and'personality,' to what do these words refer, and
what do they mean?" Hawkins argues that the establishment offacts precedes
but in part is interdigitated with the establishment of a case. It is quite
possible to extend this logic. There are quite different sorts of cases, if one
looks at them within a natural-history perspective. Consider the police:
49
A series of decisions are taken at diverse stages in the movement of
communicational units (I employ this in contrast to "case," for purposes of
this analysis) from an event that occurs in everyday life, such as a car being
recognized as missing or stolen, to a call to the police, to a message being
taken as a result of that call being received and registered by a police
operator. Once in the system as a message, it may be transformed into an
incident to be sent for further consideration by a controller in a police sub-
division, and from there may become an assignment for an officer, an
assigned task or job. The results of the disposal of this task may or may not
result in a report being written and filed. This report, in turn, may be
distributed within the police organization in a variety of ways. This may
include copies to the criminal investigation division (C.I.D.), community
constable or home beat officer, criminal records office, and so on. The case
file may, after investigation by C.I.D., or as a result of the charging officer,
be sent forward for prosecution.
At each point in this flow, which is discussed below as the decision-
making process within the decision-field, logical, cognitive partitioning of
the case is being made by participants in legal settings with authority to
make legal decisions. Each contains a set of signifiers, but their referents are
quite different and the associative context in which the facts or signifiers are
assembled varies. The nature of the decisions change from establishing facts,
to creating a case, to identifying potential for prosecution. Various sub-
programs may involve further processes, such as seeking out the offender,
fitting the offender and the crime, and ascertaining which offense to use as
the basis for a charge. Typically, although such a series of decisions around
cases is seen in terms of the ultimate legitimate ends of the institution (e.g.,
controlling crime and criminals), the logical operations involved are quite
different. Aspects of the social organization, the form and structure of these
decisions, also vary.
49. I draw here on P. Manning, supra notes * & 35, and NARCs' GAME (1980).
50. K. Hawkins, Bargain and Bluff. Compliance, Strategy, and Deterrence in the Enforce-
ment of Regulation, LAW AND POL'Y, January 1983, at 35-73.
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The question that arises, given this argument and other research pub-
lished by Hawkins,5 ' is in what sense are these decisions comparable?2 What
is being compared when one speaks of cases in the police, in prisons, in
parole boards, and in courts?
Decision, it has been argued, is not a point or a thing; it is not logically
located in any given spatial-temporal niche. It is an ideal or concept to which
many ideas and problems are brought. Matters other than the case or the
decision are important in shaping outcomes (e.g., the frames used to organize
the case, the decision-field in which it is located, or the social forces that
periodically impinge upon the social world of the deciding bureaucrat).
"Decision" perhaps refers to a family of concepts, tied together or inter-
twined like the strands that compose a rope, rather than something with one
or two invariant and static attributes or essences. 53 Decision is a linguistic
term, as rehearsed above, a set of signs variously used to label events within
legally stipulated settings-those mandated with authority by law, by au-
thoritative actors. Decisions are generally reviewed by other legally mandated
actors, and explained or accounted for with reference to legal rules, prece-
dents, procedures, and instructions to administrators found in the written
law and law in practice. "Decision" is used here as a cluster of linguistic
signs, an utterance or segment of writing or talk, that is located in a field
and process taking place in legal settings.
The Decision Field
If a decision-point is a linguistic sign for a cluster of decisions, near
decisions, ideas about decision, and matters otherwise seen as choices, it will
be marked or become focal in some fashion within organizational contexts.
For example, the flow of case-files through an organization may be routed
according to official lists of bureaucrats meant to see them, and requested
relevant actions indicated by check-marks made by those who have read or
seen them. The files themselves both stand for the decisions that surround
them and point to decisions that have been made. As signs, the case files
are reflexive in another fashion, for they anticipate a course of decisions in
the future and in the past (as Hawkins indeed notes with respect to decisions
themselves and their prospective and/or retrospective orientation). This sort
of connectedness amongst elements seen to constitute "the decision" is the
decision-process. The decision-point is yet another linguistic sign located
within a perceived, causally articulated sequence or decision-process.
The integration of these analytic elements is in the first instance produced
by the normative surroundings of law as a system producing decisions,
constituted by authoritatively legitimated actors in legal settings. Hawkins
51. Supra notes 10 and 50; Creating Cases in a Regulatory Agency, URB. LIFE, Jan. 12,
1984, at 371-395.
52. See J. Kitsuse & A. Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of Official Statistice, 11 Soc. PROBS.
131 (1963); R. NEEDHAM, supra note 19.
53. Supra note 28, at 86-87.
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develops this point early in the paper. However, the secondary integration
within legal institutional settings of law is subtle; the internal lines or
cognitive divisions are more nuanced than the external boundaries between
"legal" and "non-legal" processes. Let us examine some features of the
cognitive partitioning of the legal decision field.
(a) Frames
The first matter is Hawkins's definition of "frame":
.. the structure of knowledge, experience and values and meanings
which the decision-maker shares with others and brings to a choice
.. a master code which shapes, typifies, informs and even confirms
the character of the choice. It determines, for instance, what infor-
mation is to be sought, what is to be used, and what meaning such
information conveys, for notions of relevance and significance are
incorporated into the concept.
Thus, frame indicates a foreground as well as a set of background expectan-
cies, and it is related to boundaries and games that certain frames may
signal.5 4 Framing may be explicit or implicit, verbal or non-verbal. It may
refer either to the communication as in stress or pitch marking certain words
or phrases, or to metalinguistic markers such as explicit statements, "order
in the court," "thank you," or "goodbye," which frame what precedes and
follows. 5 In Hawkins's essay, frames are metalinguistic (marked phrases or
speech such as the indication of medical-psychiatric frame by use of words
such as "psychiatric," "depressed," or "in need of counselling") and
metacommunicational (such as an explicit announcement of one's perspective
or point of view, e.g., concern for prison management as a basis for parole
decisions). These interactional or socio-linguistic matters are implied but not
specified in Hawkins's discussion of parole. The utility of the idea of frame
is unquestioned; it might be better specified.
The idea of frame is used by Hawkins as a very central concept, since it
is that which makes meaningful "facts" assembled as a part of the decision-
making process, as well as the cases to which it is applied. It is an odd
concept, for it defines matters, acts to change their meaning, and defines
itself.5 6 The internal cognitive processes that define "legal" itself as well as
"legal decision" are in part framing matters, and in part matters resulting
from the sense of what is going on generally when legal decisions are taken.
To advance this problem a bit further, the broad contours of the legal
frame may be known, but the frame may not be constituted as Hawkins
argues of "shared knowledge, experience, values and meanings." In the
argument made here, in fact, it is the linguistic account of the decision,
54. H. Garfinkel, supra note 13.
55. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 8; B. USPENSKY, A POETICS OF COMPOSITION (1983).
56. G. BATESON, STEPS TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 177-93 (1972).
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including perhaps the explicit or implicit frame, that provides the coherence,
not the ostensively shared meanings arising in the event. Erving Goffman,
in his little classic, The Presentation of Self (1959), shows how the appearance
of consensus and agreement is often just that, and furthermore that it is
appearance that is sought and nothing more. "Shared consensus" is often
an impediment to pragmatic action, as Hawkins certainly suggests.
5 7
Thus, an empirical exercise of some importance would be to identify the
number, kinds of frames employed, and degree of consensus on these frames
that obtains in a given legal setting. From these data, one might seek to
establish the degree of coherence in the frame (how integral and well-defined
it is); the clarity of its boundaries (overlap amongst frames); the degree of
consensus on the relevance of given frames to decision-making processes
generally (and over the course of a decision-process); the durability of frames;
and, perhaps, the relative power they possess when used to constrain or
account for decisions.
Frame is a structural property of legal settings. It may be that frames
are related to the degree of routinization of the tasks of the decision-makers,
and that the more routine the task (such as a parole decision rather than the
decision to charge someone with a crime), the fewer the frames and the
greater their power to constrain choice. There are institutional aspects of the
frame, legal aspects, that might sharpen empirical questions surrounding
decisions. Several of these will be discussed.
There is a degree of "institutionalised misrecognition ' 5 8 that denies
contradictions within the law and maintains the stability of the cognitive
processes characteristically found there. In fact, one of the preconditions of
entering the legal world is an unwillingness to accept anything other than a
decision expressed in terms of winning or losing.5 9 The official language of
law invests the decision with authority, and this language, as Bourdieu
brilliantly asserts,60 represents participants to themselves and their actions to
themselves. It presents as real and constraining the sanctions involved in
violating such a representation. (E.g., the law is a means of decision-making;
lawyers are decision-makers; law produces clear outcomes.) It marks the
dividing line between the "thinkable and the unthinkable. ' ' 6'
This "officialisation is only one aspect of the objectifying process
through which the group teaches itself and conceals from itself its own truth,
inscribing in objectivity its representation of what it is and thus binding itself
by this public declaration. ' 62 Bourdieu sees institutions providing a kind of
cognitive inertia and blindness, meaning that rarely are choices made in a
reflective sense. They are rather a function of the institutional structures
57. See P. Rossi & R. Berk, Varieties of Normative Consensus, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 333-347
(1985).
58. P. BOURDIEU, supra note 29.
59. N. Luhman, supra note 17.
60. P. BORDLEU, supra note 29, at 21-22, 171ff.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 22.
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which produce the objective constraints as well as the social representations
by which such practices are validated, objectivated, and granted the status
of truth.
The guaranteed misrecognition of the contradictions within the law and
legal decision-making, such as those between the forms and structures
Hawkins describes and the model of discrete choice attributed to judges in
public settings, can be made problematic. They are the products of represen-
tational tools such as frames. Legal actors may be aware, to various degrees,
of potential, implicit, alternative truths in their work. Bourdieu, 63 writing
about anthropological models of gift exchange, captures this dualistic aware-
ness:
If the system is to work, the agents must not be entirely unaware of
the truth of their exchanges, which is made explicit in the anthro-
pologist's model, while at the same time they must refuse to know
and above all to recognize it. In short, everything takes place as if
agents' practice, and in particular their manipulation of time, were
organized exclusively with a view to concealing from themselves and
from others the truth of their practice, which the anthropologist and
his models bring to light simply by substituting the timeless model
for a scheme which works itself out only in and through time.
This observation is also relevant to the social-science view of actors in the
legal system and their decision-making practices. The shifting awareness of
participants is accepted. Tensions between consciousness and choice and
objective constraints of institutional practices maintain both the notion of
contingency and freedom of individual choice and acknowledged constraints.
There is some ambiguity in Hawkins' treatment of strategy and tactics,
in particular in his discussion of parole decisions. There is some danger,
perhaps as a result of seeing decisions as consequences, in making a teleo-
logical connection between a named consequence and some either institution-
ally described official end (a matter Hawkins quite clearly wishes to avoid)
or some motive or aim of "strategizing" groups. Strategy, when seen as
official discourse, dominates choices as inevitable consequences of organi-
zational interests. As a result, notions that are "fuzzier," such as "disposi-
tions" or one's sense of justice or fairness, become submerged.
The master frame is indicated by use of such terms as "legal," "the
law," "legal decisions," or, in England, sub judice. It may be indicated by
physical settings, such as those found in a courtroom, police station, or
welfare office; by symbolic indicators regardless of setting, such as costumes,
uniforms, or props of various kinds; or by verbal (metacommunicational)
marking of settings, props, or relations. These may be in apposite configu-
ration, as when a police officer in uniform appears in court and is shown to
provide veridical testimony, or only one may serve as a key in a situation or
field.
63. Id. at 6.
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The master frame may include in some various ways other frames that
cluster or cohere as law-like or quasi-legal in character, such as the "reha-
bilitative" subframe used in parole decisions described by Hawkins, or the
"organisational interests" (e.g., "control of the joint") subframe. These
frames may be in conflict, may or may not be shared by participants, may
be used, and may explicitly or implicitly be aspects of a strategy (temporal
deployment of interests).
The notion of a frame may be either general and institutional or it may
be merely a cognitive device ordering a given message within an institutional
context. Hawkins has provided examples of legal master frames, institutional
frames and subframes; it is also possible to see frame as the principles used
by an actor to order a given message, separate it from a set of other activities,
noise, and equivocation (uncertainty about the validity of a given message),
and to identify salient elements within that message." If a police officer is
attending an assignment concerning a barking dog at a house and another
assignment arrives by radio concerning a violent fight at a nearby pub, the
sound of the barking dog, and the complainants' voices will be noise and
the paperwork involved will become the field. The radio-transmitted assign-
ment describing the pub fight will now become the message. The level of
detail required to examine such individual cognitive framing is beyond the
scope of a brief paper, but such fundamental discerning processes substruc-
ture the use of institutional frames.
Frame is a matter of perspective or modality, and thus can change and
produce changes in the ordering of processes and their relevances. Uspensky 65
details the difference between an "internal" and an "external" perspective
in narrative which parallels legal decisions when one moves from participant
in institutional decisions to an object or consequence of others' decisions.
Perhaps Hawkins has not explored sufficiently the relationship between
elements of a decision, "facts," and the "background." Just as facts change
when frame changes, background and foreground change as well. Hawkins
shows that in some cases "individual facts" located in case files are seen as
constituting the foreground of decision, i.e., the stated basis for releasing or
retaining a prisoner. Institutional considerations such as crowding, discipline,
and the morale of staff and administrators, can also be foreground. They
can reverse, "background" becoming "foreground," while the former "fore-
ground" becomes "background." The ways in which background and fore-
ground oscillate are very complex, as studies of literary texts show,6 and
perhaps such devices as simplification, reversal, metaphor, displacement, and
distortion are part of the framing of a decision and the alternation in relevant
frames. 67
64. P. Manning, supra note *
65. B. USPENSKY, supra note 55, at 137-51.
66. Id.; J. Culler, supra note 21.
67. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 8.
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The Situated Relevance of the Non-Field
Either the concepts of decision-point, process, and field have been
modified or new definitions advanced for them. Decision-points lie within a
decision-process, and the field in which both are located is defined analyti-
cally by the existence of master frames, frames, and subframes. The latter
provide the internal cognitive substructuring of the legal domain, whilst the
master frame denotes legal decisions. Such an expanded conception of
decision-making also requires an operative notion about how matters nor-
mally seen to exist outside the frame "intrude" or become relevant to
decision-making. There is a recognized non-field, excluded by focus upon
the field, but nevertheless potentially or occasionally relevant to a decision-
process. This non-field is of sporadic importance in any institutional context,
as the term ceteris paribus suggests in economic analyses. Hawkins's discus-
sion of parole decisions depicts the "normal process" and field without
reference to the non-field. This is presumably because the periods described
were characterized by fairly routine decision-making. The degree of stability
of the field, however, is variable.
Some features of a non-field are important. Field is not defined by
exclusion, e.g., "all x that is not y," for definition here is a matter of
overlap of concern where the timing and location of the actual overlap is
not precisely predictable. If one thinks of a lunar eclipse as an overlap of
points of interest (a planet and the moon when viewed from the perspective
of earth), and omits the routine predictability of the appearance of the
eclipse, then one has an analog of the relevance of the non-field. It is an
overlap of interests in a decision-field in which previously, only marginally
relevant matters, the penumbra, become salient in the field. The forces or
ideas that attain this pertinence are seen in normal periods as outside
immediate consideration but of potential concern. They are near forces with
a degree of control if carefully maneuvered with and about. These forces
are often tacit, or barely acknowledged in the normal course of events; they
may be considered in passing or in a hypothetical way.68 Forces in the
penumbra can be differentiated from forces that are known but perceived as
uncontrolled. These are matters that, when relevant, are controlling and
important, rather than matters that are seen as controlling and more or less
outside the control of the institution.
Since they have the character of powerful forces that can alter the course
of events they are viewed by bureaucratic decision-makers as matters of
"politics," rather than of "administration." In practice, this often means
the intrusion, into rule-bound and office-determined practices and proce-
dures, of an element of uncertainty, power, or unexpected room for maneu-
ver. 69 From the perspective of the bureaucrat, even one who exercises
influence on matters of work rather broadly, such as a police narcotics
68. M. POLANYI, supra note 19.
69. J. Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, PuB. LAW 178 (1973).
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specialist, these forces interrupt a "normal," case-by-case approach to work
tasks, and give it a new texture. It may take on a coloration of crisis, or
political intervention, or other more loaded terms such as "scandal." It is
precisely when such intrusions are seen to have happened that matters of
"policy" become the order of the day. Policy connotes regulation and
abstract general rules for the ordering of decisions, and hence provides a
shield or protection against the charge of capriciousness or arbitrariness seen
as characterizing decision-making in "normal times." The logical strength
of the law and legal reasoning is that they serve as a resource for the
justification of decisions. 70 The argument about the relevance of the non-
field requires further clarification of two types of disruptions in the bureau-
cratic field:
The first type of disruption is the internally controlled intrusion of
"outside" factors as a result of which adjustments are made quietly without
public recognition nor claims of governmental or legal error. These are
sometimes seen as "cover-ups" if later revealed, or as "managed crises" if
unrevealed. Some examples of how the field and non-field overlap, and how
the non-field becomes a consideration in decision-making, are seen in Emer-
son's work. 7' He argues for the effects on allocation of resources when one
is working on a case-by-case basis. When resources are scarce and case-
workers must be assigned to a case, the marginal effects on case-decisions
will be seen when resources are perceived as scarce with respect to this case.
This, of course, only occurs when each case requires resource allocation, and
screening does not occur prior to this point, such as in detective work.72
Perhaps more broadly construed forces can come into play. Thus, although
a crisis could be anticipated in general as a possible constraint or part of the
field, it is "unpredictable" in its precise form and appearance, and is seen
as outside normal, judicial, police, and prison decisions until a tipping point
is reached.
In the regulatory world, the maintenance schedules for nuclear reactors
in the United Kingdom are fixed in the conditions of the license; reactors
normally require routine maintenance on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis,
and major maintenance (reactor shut down, fuel removed and replaced,
reactor re-started) on a one-year rota (one of the two reactors on a site is
checked each year, on an alternating basis). The required scheduled mainte-
nance is then described to the Nuclear Installations' Inspectorate as having
been carried out. During the miners' strike of 1984-85, the potential shortage of
coal meant that government drew on stockpiles, imported more coal, borrowed
some electricity from France, and required nuclear power stations' output
70. E. Bittner, The Police on Skid Row: A Study of Peace-Keeping, 32 AM. Soc. Rv.
699 (1967).
71. Holistic Effects in Social Control Decision-Making, 17 LAW AND SoC'Y REv. 425-455
(1983).
72. Cf. W. Wagel, Case Routinisation in Investigative Police Work, 28 Soc. PROBS. 263
(1981); R. ERICSON, supra note 30.
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rather more than usual. (The normal percentage of all electrical power
provided by coal was about 89 and fell to 59, whilst the percentage provided
to the grid by nuclear power stations increased from 13 to 34.) Decisions
made about routine and yearly maintenance, fueling and refueling, and
operative temperature and pressure ranges, were all affected by the govern-
ment's policy to contain the strike and to avoid any loss of power in the winter.
Broader conceptions of forces at work are necessarily a part of any considera-
tion of the social organization of decision-making, because the pattern of in-
trusion of these forces is known, recognized, and relevant yet unpredictable
in appearance and consequence.
A second type of disruption occurs when focused public attention
provides a shift in relevance from case-by-case operations into more policy-
constrained decisions. This means that routine decision-making is altered.
The shift to more policy-oriented actions can occur when a famous case
arises on which public opinion has been mobilized. (The case of parole for
Sirhan Sirhan, for example, is not treated in the media and in public opinion
as are others, and one would assume this has effects on the behavior and
field in which the board takes these decisions.) A sudden change in admin-
istrators, whether by political means or not, can change the decision field,
as occurred when an appointee of President Carter was replaced by a Reagan
appointee in O.S.H.A. 3 Such field/non-field dynamics can only be captured
in historical studies or time-based studies in which broader ideological,
organizational, and political forces can be monitored to discern their effects
on a pattern or process of decision-making.
This also alerts one to themes struck in a decision-process; the introduc-
tion of values as justifications for decisions that alter the environment in
which decisions are taken. These may come from ideological sources, such
as the change from rehabilitation to "just deserts" models of punishment,
or from administrative reorganization of a department. Typically, the intro-
duction of such spurious precision as is associated with management by
objectives, pert charts, systems analysis, and program budgeting changes the
rationales for decisions and obscures the nature of the actual field and
process.
74
The "intrusion" of the non-field into the field of decisions, whether it
takes the form of political scandals or of revelations; changes in the relevance
of political events to routine bureaucratic processing of cases; and public
concern about given cases of an exceptional character, alter the field. More
detailed case studies will be required to set out the dynamics of such
intrusions.
73. See A. Szasz, Industrial Resistance to Occupational Health and Safety Legislation:
1971-1981, 32 Soc. PROBS. 103 (1984).
74. See I. Hoos, SYSTEM ANALYSIS IN PUBLIC POLICY (1972); A. Wildavsky, The Political





The concepts of decision, decision-making, and legal decision-making
are complemented by the concepts of decision-field and non-field, by frame,
sub-frame, and master frame, and by boundaries. It is argued here that the
use of semiotics and the study of semiotic patterning will provide a perspec-
tive within which traditional case-oriented legal reasoning might be seen. The
study of the social organization of decision-making by naturalistic means in
legal settings is just beginning.
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